Towards Socialism) administration's avowed goals of decolonising the nation-state and incorporating indigenous populations more comprehensively into decision-making practices of the state, "the sense remains that resource extraction blessed by the government trumps all other considerations" (Bebbington et al 2010: 313) . Within this chapter, I contend that there is a persistent logic of 'coloniality' embedded within the MAS's self-styled 'indigenous' state. Yet, indigenous movements continue their decolonial efforts through demands for self-determination, which would entail the delinking of state machinery from its colonial foundation. Postcolonial thinkers, such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, are questioned for grounding their work in the poststructuralism of Foucault, Lacan and Derrida. Mignolo argues that they present "a project of scholarly transformation within the academy" (2007b: 452) that remains internal to Europe. Instead, decoloniality is understood as a project of 'desprendimiento' (Quijano 1992) or 'delinking' (Mignolo 2007b ) from contemporary legacies of coloniality. This includes coloniality of power (Quijano 1992 (Quijano , 2000 , knowledge (see Lander 2000) and being (MaldonadoTorres 2007) . Delinking starts from "other sources" (Mignolo 2007b: 452) , such as the activism and scholarship of Mahatma Gandhi, Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, to name a few examples. This politico-epistemic move is crucial for displacing Eurocentric knowledge and bringing subaltern epistemologies into the fold. To be sure, this is a move I look to pursue in this chapter by drawing on ethnographic engagement with indigenous movements in defence of the TIPNIS from September 2011 to June 2012, including six weeks on the Ninth Indigenous March (a second march in defence of the TIPNIS).
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That said, I work from a position that does not reject postcolonial critiques from the West in their entirety, in part since there is no 'outside' of modernity that can be recovered simply by focusing on marginalised and silenced voices in the Global South. To do so, risks a romanticism and essentialism of identitarian politics, particularly in regards to race and ethnicity. In reference to indigenous peoples, for example, Radcliffe recognises that "the emancipatory valence of indigeneity is neither natural nor automatic" (2017: 223), but rather relational. Indeed, this can be seen in the Bolivian case, where there has been a substantial re-signification of indigenous identity politics over time.
The MCD collective's views also seem at odds with the fact that a large number of its proponents hold academic positions in North American institutions. Asher points out that they evade the problem of representation and fall into the trap of "making the subaltern speak " (2013: 832) . With this in mind, I agree with Asher that bringing Spivak (1987; 1990; 2014) into conversation with the MCD project would add conceptual rigour. More recently, Spivak conceptualises subalternity as:
"the idea of no access to the structures of citizenship, the structures of the state" (2014: 10).
Although indigenous peoples are recognised as constitutional citizens of the Bolivian state and given rights as collective subjects, the government has established certain limits and sanctions -a distinction between de jure and de facto political power -that constitutes a 'domestication' of decolonial trajectories (Garcés 2011: 46) . Using Spivak's interpretation of the problem of representation, one may argue that factions of the indigenous populations are unable to 'speak' since they have not had their constitutional rights to self-determination (and free, prior and informed consent) respected and complied with. The TIPNIS protestors pushed at these limits and sought, as Saldaña-Portillo remarks in reference to indigenous Mexicans, a shift from "the position of the subaltern who evades representation … to the position of constitutional subject: the Indian as citizen as Indian" (2001: 412) . Fundamentally, I argue that the TIPNIS protestors were enacting a decolonial move aimed at transcending their own subalternity. Subalternisation can therefore be understood as a relational process constantly reworked through the spatial dynamics of cultural hegemony (Rabasa 2010) . This chapter will first outline the antecedents to the TIPNIS conflict, indicating some of the contradictions embedded within the MAS's decolonial project. I then discuss processes of coloniality within the state, including the government's use of police intervention against the indigenous marchers on the Eighth March and the use of a development narrative based on ideas of progress, modernity and assimilation. This section is followed by an examination of the ways in which the TIPNIS struggle has mobilised subaltern memories of a collective "colonial wound" (Mignolo 2005: 95) . Although not widely chronicled by scholars of the conflict, I argue that analyses of colonial legacies are vital since they shape subaltern resistance in the present. Finally, I document the ways in which the lowland indigenous movement has resisted contemporary processes of colonial subjugation, namely through the use of non-violent protest marches to assert their right to be represented in the public sphere.
The Plurinational State: A Decolonial Move?
In 2006, Evo Morales became president of Bolivia with 54 percent of the votes. The MAS, the party behind the so-called 'social-movement state' (Gustafson 2009a: 255) , had its roots in the Unity Pact, a national alliance among the country's five principal peasant and indigenous grassroots movements, including the two indigenous organisations of the lowlands and highlands: CIDOB and CONAMAQ (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu; Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo). Despite fragmentary objectives, the Pact had a united vision to 'refound' the country "through the participation of indigenous peoples as peoples (pueblos)" (Garcés 2011: 50) .
That is to say, to foreground collective -rather than individual -subjects of decision-making within state structures. This conceptualisation of governance was articulated through the demand for a Constituent Assembly that aimed to transcend the colonial legacy of liberal democracy that accompanies the ideology of the modern nation-state. For some, this shift constitutes a decolonial transition (see Escobar 2010) . (1984: 71) . Under the land reform decree, indigenous peoples were referred to as "in a savage state and with a primitive organization" and denied full-fledged citizen status (cited in Jones 1984: 76) .
Although the law was later changed, the view that the lowlands was tierras baldías (public or vacant lands) served to awaken investors to the opportunity of obtaining land titles, with the Amazonian region becoming a new frontier for development and expansion (Jones 1984; Lehm Ardaya 1999) . In the area around the TIPNIS, this colonisation continued with the migration of Andean peasants to the south of the park after the closure of state mines under the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. The cultivation of coca has been the predominant livelihood of these migrants, converting the Chapare province into the biggest coca producing area of Bolivia, with the cocalero (coca-grower) movement becoming a formidable political force (Healy 1991; Paz 2012) . Since the 1990s a significant ethnicisation of national politics served to unite peasant and indigenous factions, however (see Postero 2007; Van Cott 2005) . Most notably, various social movements and trade unions came together in popular resistance during the Water and Gas Wars.
3 These groups lent their support to the MAS, which showed a marked ability to subsume heterogeneous identities under an 'indigenous nationalism' that crosscut class and ethnicity (Stefanoni 2006: 37) . Indeed, for Vice-President García Linera "Evo symbolises the breaking of an imaginary and horizon of possibilities restricted to the subalternity of the indigenous" (cited in Svampa & Stefanoni 2007: 147) .
Tensions between the government's self-styled 'indigenous' state and indigenous movements remain, however. Most notably, land and resource conflicts have been a key feature of the MAS's three administration periods. There are two interconnected grounds for this contestation. Firstly, the MAS has significantly departed from the Unity Pact's decolonial agenda on several fronts, for instance: the Pact originally proposed that indigenous peoples be granted veto power on the exploitation of non-renewable resources within their territories, but this was redacted from the final version of the Constitution; indigenous autonomy status is difficult to achieve due to restrictive As the Bolivian writer Bautista concludes, "to decolonise the state means dismantling the structural and conceptual content of its colonial constitution" (2010: 10). This change would involve the restructuring of state mechanisms to integrate the respective forms of decision-making carried out by ethnic nations. Without this, the MAS can no longer act as the articulator at an organisational level of indigenous demands (Tapia 2011: 41) . The degree to which the plurinational state is inherently a decolonial move is therefore limited in part, as it fails to overthrow the coloniality of power embedded within modern state institutions and recognise the alternative spatio-political imaginaries of subalternised indigenous sectors.
Progressive Neo-Extractivism, Coloniality and the TIPNIS
The TIPNIS conflict exemplifies these challenges for the plurinational project. The TIPNIS (an area of over 1.2 million hectares) sits on the border area between the departments of Beni and
Cochabamba. This highly biologically diverse region was recognised as a national park in 1965 at a time when conservation was deemed important due to threats from increasing land colonisation in the Amazonian region as a result of the 1953 agrarian reform law (Paz 2012 ). The park is home to 69 communities and was legally recognised as an indigenous territory in 1990 as a result of the historic march led by CIDOB. The legal titling was made more concrete through a process of 'saneamiento de tierras' (land cleansing) and in 1997 the indigenous communities were granted a TCO (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen; First Nations or 'Original' Communal Lands) title. At this time, a 'línea roja'
(red line) was established separating the TCO from a colonised area to the south of the national park, known as Polygon 7, that is predominantly inhabited by coca-growers (see Figure 1) . The TIPNIS has been under threat despite this dual protection status, not only as a result of the proposed road, but also due to interrelated processes, namely the expansion of coca growing and the oil and gas extraction (McNeish 2013) . Notably, the road would open up access to natural resources with concessions granted for hydrocarbon exploration in 25.5 percent of the TIPNIS (CEDLA 2012; see Figure 1 ). Further, the conflict has pitted highland peasants and lowland indigenous peoples against one another, since many Andean migrants and coca growers living adjacent to the park have supported the road (Fabricant & Postero 2015) . Significantly, this sector is a key base of support for
Morales who made his name as the charismatic leader of the cocalero movement. Government discourse proclaimed the necessity of the road for the integration of the eastern and western regions of Bolivia. The development agenda was rationalised through a discourse of 'modernity' and 'progress' that echoed the assimilationist logic of the government after the 1952 national revolution (Laing 2015; Sanjinés 2013) . In reference to the TIPNIS conflict, Tapia writes that
he idea of the lowlands as a space of colonisation corresponds to the lack of recognition of the existence of other peoples and their territories" (2012: 271). Tellingly, after the lowland indigenous movement announced that they were going to organise a protest march resisting the construction of the road, the President declared "whether they want it or not, we are going to build this road" (Los . Even where communities agreed to the proposal of the road, it has been suggested that the consultation process was manipulated since the wording focused on whether communities wanted Law No. 180 -the act that cancelled the road project -to be restored. This was a double-edged sword, however, since it also described the TIPNIS as an 'intangible' (untouchable) zone, which would prohibit the inhabitants of the park from using its natural resources for wealth production.
The process of building consent was also marked by gift giving since the inception of the road project. For instance, the leader of the Ninth March, Bertha Vejarano, stated that she had seen the government "taking them [TIPNIS communities] gifts, buying their conscience. The government uses them, convinces them to say 'yes to the road', by taking them things that are not worth it. Taking them motors and cell phones" (personal interview, 15 May 2012). Quispe, the significance of prior consultation is more than just a legislative framework, since it "is a mechanism for other rights, such as self-determination, autonomy, [and] self-governance and that is important for us. It is one of the safeguards for protecting indigenous peoples" (personal interview, 29 April 2012). Further still, when asked whether the communities would have accepted the road project had they been consulted, the President of Sécure Sub-Central (one of two organising bodies within the TIPNIS), Emilio Noza Yuco affirmed that, "the communities would always accept a prior consultation process before approving a project. But now, they feel they have been humiliated, sidelined by the government" (personal interview, 9 May 2012). Fundamentally then, resistance to the road was also a call for greater self-determination over decisions affecting communally owned indigenous territories. In the next section, I demonstrate that the indigenous protest was shaped by collective memories of a 'colonial wound' (Mignolo 2005: 95) resulting from a long history of settler colonialism into indigenous lands. In turn, these memories were mobilised to fashion a subaltern version of the past to suit the political needs of the present.
Mobilising Subaltern Pasts Toward Decolonial Futures
Intellectual engagement with the TIPNIS conflict has predominantly circulated around the extent to which Bolivia can now be conceived of as a 'post-neoliberal' state. Though pertinent, these discussions have not engaged fully with the historical experiences of colonial territorialisation and ensuing anti-colonial resistance in the Amazonian regions. 6 This is not surprising given that popularised chronicles of Bolivia have focused on the history of the Andean region, which Fabricant claims "has left a lasting mark on internal cultural politics and academic frameworks and continues to influence policy-making" (2012: 22). Here, I attempt to address this gap in the literature by using ethnographic engagement with the TIPNIS protest marches to illuminate the ways that "long memories" have served to instil "people with a sense of continuity, the inevitability of resistance, and the legitimacy of struggle" (Kohl & Farthing 2011: 196) . Specifically, I focus on the ways that place-based millenarian movements 'en busca de la Loma Santa' (in search of the Holy Hill) have been re-articulated in pan-indigenous movements for the recognition of indigenous territory in lowland Bolivia. 
Spatial Politics of the Indigenous Marches
Since the inception of CIDOB -the umbrella organisation of the lowland indigenous movement -in 1982, the concept of 'territory' has become "an icon of indigenous-state relations" (Postero 2007: 49) . Specifically, CIDOB has called for a degree of autonomy and self-determination over the governance of land and resources within ancestral territories, alongside greater participation in state institutions through their respective organisational forms (Yashar 2005) . The plurinational agenda has been at the heart of these decolonial struggles and CIDOB therefore aligned itself to the MAS government through the Unity Pact. Yet, the Pact's indigenous and peasant members have long held contrasting views on key issues such as the nature of national development, the extent of land redistribution, the meaning and limits of political autonomy and the social control of the state (Garcés 2011) . Tensions ran high when defining the organisational structure of the Constituent Assembly, for example, as the law established that representation would be through political parties "thus failing to acknowledge the demand of the indigenous organizations (many of them with limited regional presence) for representation as collective subjects" (Regalsky 2010: 46) . As such, CIDOB representatives increasingly questioned the extent to which the MAS was fulfilling its promises of decolonising Bolivia. Consequently, in late 2011 -when the TIPNIS conflict was at its peak -the two indigenous movements of the lowlands and highlands abandoned the Unity Pact.
Juan José Sardina, a leader from the highland indigenous organisation CONAMAQ, explained that they had chosen to leave the Unity Pact as they "were simply being used by the President for electoral spoils" (personal interview, 17 June 2012). Rosa Chao, a regional leader of CIDOB, stated that Morales had treated the lowland Amazonian peoples "as if we are entenados [stepchildren or illegitimate children i.e. looked down upon]". She explained that,
We had a dream that we [indigenous peoples] would be inside the parliament, with a minister, a vice-minister, deputies and senators. We are in the process, as at least now we have seven deputies. But for us, it [Bolivia] is not yet a plurinational state. It will be called 'plurinational' when we are represented by the ministries, viceministries and the mayors. I woke early to the noise of people packing up, alerting me to the fact that we were definitely marching today. We headed from El Algodonal towards San Ignacio de Moxos at around 8am. I was a little scared this morning after hearing that drunken locals had been circling our campsite on motorbikes through the night and threatening to hurt people. Even the researchers from the NGO Fundación Tierra Source: Personal field-notes.
The song gained notoriety through performances in a number of public spaces as a tool to articulate the collective demands of the indigenous movement to wider sectors of civil society. For example, Luis Rico and Nazareth Flores, one of the indigenous leaders of the movement, sang the anthem when the marchers entered Plaza San Francisco on the Eighth March. Their moving rendition swept through the crowd and invigorated the marchers after a seven-hour descent into the capital city. The music was especially poignant when the soft dynamics and slow tempo of the verses juxtaposed the gradual crescendo of the chorus and the impassioned call for 'coraje' (courage) with hundreds of paceños (residents of La Paz) joining in. Nazareth had captured media attention because of her emotional oral testimony of the events at Chaparina when she was gassed, had her hands tied and was thrown onto a truck resulting in a miscarriage. The crowd was stirred when she changed the last line of the song "de los hermanos la solidaridad" (the solidarity of brothers) to "de los hermanos paceños dignidad" (the dignity of paceño brothers). In this moment the song developed what Bigenho has described in her work on Bolivian music as "experiential authenticity"; or the shared experience of an embodied practice and sonorous performance that acts to create a common bond (2002: 17-18) . The song played an integral role in gaining visibility (and audibility) for the demands of the lowland indigenous movement and in providing a cultural expression of urban solidarity.
Crucially, the song also expresses collective histories of colonial subjugation in the lowland Yet, subaltern agency has also been critical to the decolonial project of plurinationalism, which has been re-crafted through practices of domination and resistance in the past and present. In particular, histories of (post)colonial subordination of lowland indigenous peoples have served to instil collective spatial imaginaries of territoriality, governance and nationhood. These subaltern geographies have shaped resistance to the government-backed road project, alongside attempts to make space for lowland indigenous peoples in the imaginary of the nation-state. The TIPNIS struggle has strengthened and given new meanings to the project of 'interculturality' (see Walsh 2009), further disrupting the hegemonic political order and its associated spatio-political structures. Indeed, this decolonial trajectory is apparent through CIDOB's contemporary slogan 'Bolivia nunca más sin los pueblos indígenas' (Bolivia never again without the indigenous peoples).
More broadly, this analysis speaks to wider debates on whether decolonisation can ever be fulfilled within the confines of the colonial apparatus of the modern nation-state. As in Ecuador (see Radcliffe, this volume) , the incorporation of indigenous subaltern agendas into the national constitution has not achieved de facto decolonisation. Indeed, MCD proponents have highlighted the need for a programmatic delinking from contemporary legacies of coloniality. Rather, they argue, decolonial thinking must be fostered from the sites of colonial difference. Analytical treatment of subaltern geographies therefore requires a commitment to receptivity and (un)learning from and with the spaces of what Mignolo calls "epistemic disobedience" (2011: 139).
